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Abstract—In the problem of bootstrapping, an agent learns
to use an unknown body, in an unknown world, starting from
zero information about the models involved. This is a fascinating
problem, which so far has not been given a proper formalization.
In this paper, we give a rigorous definition of what it means
for an agent to be able to use “uninterpreted” observations
and commands: there are some disturbances, represented by
group actions, that modify what we call “semantic maps”. The
range of disturbances tolerated by an agent indirectly encode the
assumptions needed by the agent. We argue that the behavior
of agent which claims optimality (in any sense) must actually
be invariant to such disturbances, and we discuss several design
principles which allow to obtain this invariance for observations
nuisances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eventually1, robots are set to leave the structured environ-
ments of the industrial floors and share our lives, be them
patient workers in our houses or embodied as intelligent cars.
Still, there are many challenges ahead for such systems that
must operate in unstructured environment, for long periods of
time, with the necessary safety. The short-term problem, which
is being addressed by projects such as ROS [2], is the software
consolidation of the myriads of algorithms and processes that
make up such a system. The long-term problem is that those
software systems will be much more complicated than current
projects, perhaps exceeding the design complexity which can
be handled by a human: we remember Dijkstra’s admonition
that, ultimately, design complexity must be bounded by the
size of a human skull [3]. It seems that the scarcest resource
for designing robotic systems will not be computation, power,
or an adequate sensory apparatus, but our design ability.
Therefore, it is likely that in the future all applications of
learning will have an increasing role in robotics research. In
particular, we speculate that developmental learning theories
will be most important to design robots robust to unforeseen
changes in their sensors, actuators and environment, and
especially robots who are aware of such changes, according to
Sutton’s verification principle [4], which is an ability sorely
missing at the current state of the art. However, it appears
that the message of the community that gravitates towards
conferences such as ICDL/EpiRob has not been received by
a large part of the more applied roboticists that gravitate
towards conferences such as ICRA, IROS, RSS (except for
the few people dabbling in both). One possible reason is that
some of the problems studied in developmental learning have
evaded so far a precise mathematical formalization. This is
entirely reasonable for a field which aims at imitating the
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Equations (1)-(2) appear convoluted because they work with
the much abstract definition of system we used. However,
the end result is that we have defined the meaning of a
transformation D ￿→ h ·D · g; reading right to left, the input
signals are filtered by the group element g; then the system
produces an output, which is filtered according to the group
element h.
C. Defining agents
In the following, we let U be the command space, Y be
the observations space, and world ∈ D(Y,U) represent the
model of everything in between observations and commands.
To formalize the learning agent, we assume that it is composed
of a two-part strategy. The first part consists in learning a
representation of the world (more or less explicit); and in the
second phase, using this representation to do something (or to
estimate something). We model the agent as a tuple of two
functions modeling learning and action.
Definition 4. A bootstrapping agent fo a world world ∈
D(Y,U) is a tuple ￿R, learn, act￿ such that R is the represen-
tation space, learn ∈ D(U × R,Y) is the learning/exploration
strategy; and act : R → D(U ,Y) is the action/estimation
phase. We denote by learn(world) = r ∈ R the representation
learned after a suitable training phase. We define as A(U ,Y)
the set of all agents interacting with the world through
commands in U and observations Y .
The learning strategy is defined as an element of D(U ×
R,Y), which means it is a dynamical system which has as
input the observations (Y), and as output the commands (U )
that drive the exploration, and the internal represe tation (R).
In t is paper, we treat the repr sentation m stly as an opaque
object.
The acting strategy act is a map from R to D(U ,Y); this
means that the learned representation R is converted into a
dynamical system which will do the actual interacting with the
world. We remark that this dynamical system has, in general,
an internal state. For example, R might include a description
of the ensor calibration and t e statistics of the environment;
from that, one generates the dyamical syste act(R) hich
might include logic for estimation of an internal state (e.g. the
agent’s state in localization, or a complete map in SLAM)1.
Note also that using the abstract Definition 1 does not exclude
any kind randomized behavior for the agent.
Finally, notice that in this discussion we are neglecting all
sorts of problems about how to properly define the tra ning
phase; when to stop it; the tradeoff of exporation/explotation;
etc. All these concerns are important but somewhat orthogonal
to our main interest.
D. Bootstrapping as invariance to the group actions
We have defined the world, the agent, and how the world
transforms under group nuisances. At this point, we can
1Depending on the field, “learning” is sometimes equivalent to “estimation”
(as in learning a map of the environment). In this paper, we use “learning” for
the problem of deriving what we call “representation” of the world dynamics,
and use “estimation” for inferring the state of system, given a known dynamics
(these id as bl r into each other, but it makes sense to use “l ar ing” for th
harder problem).
introduce the main theoretical point of this paper: it is possible
to transform vague constraints such as “the agent has no
assumptions on the model” into precise algebraic conditions
on the world-agent loop; specifically, an agent does not
need certain information if its behavior is invariant to group
nuisan es acting on the world that destroy that particular
information. The following is the formal statement.
Definition 5. Let the world world belong to a family of models
W ⊂ D(T,U ,Y). Let the groups GU , GY be left and right
actions on the world world. We say that an agent ￿R, learn, act￿
is invariant to the action of (GU ,GY) for the family W if
(act ◦ learn)(h · world · g) = g−1 · (act ◦ learn)(world) · h−1
for all h ∈ GY , g ∈ GU , and world ∈W.
It is easy to see that, if this condition holds, then the
nuisances have no effect on the agent’s actions (g−1 and g
cancel, and likewise for h). The simplest example is when the
groups represent linear scaling (gains of the actuators, or units
of measuremnts for the observations); if the gain is doubled,
we expect that the produced commands will be halved.
Note also that, while the input-output behavior is un-
changed; the internal representation is allowed to change; what
happens to the internal representation is an interesting question
that we will not investigate in this paper.
III. ANALYSIS FOR BDS SYSTEMS
The point of all of this is that now we have a language to
say exactly what we require of a bootstrapping agent. Here we
apply it to the results in previous work, as a simple example
in preparation to the new results described later.
In previous work, we considered this class of bilinear
models, justifying the choice by saying that it is the simplest
nonlinearity that can represent several sensors. There is some
similarity with other systems considering 3-way interactions
of systems that we intend to investigate in the future [?].
Definition 6. A bilinear dynamics sensor (BDS) if its sensor
y ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rk dynamics, and there exists a (n, n×k) tensor
M such that y˙s = Msviy
vui.
We call BDS(n, k) the set of all such systems. Note that
h re, in the discrete case, s is an index that spans over 1, . . . , n
sensels; but most considerations are valid if s is a continuous
index over a manifold, with integration instead of summation.
Writing the system in the form y˙ = (M::1y)u
1 + (M::2y)u
2 +
. . . . makes it clear that the system being bilinear means having
multiple autonomous linear dynamics among which to choose.
A purely affine part (y˙ = · · · + Bu) can be represented by
adding a dummy observation with constant value.
The following is an extension of the agent we studied in
previous work with the language just introduced. Suppose Ωu
is the set of allowable commands (modeling power constraints
etc.).
Proposition 7. Define the agent ABDS(k, n) ∈ A(Rk,Rn),
with representation
￿
ys,Psv,Tsvi
￿
. The learning phase is de-
fined by the following set of equations. The actions are chosen
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Figure 1. A bootstrapping agent interacts with the world (which is the series
of unknown actuators, the external world, and unknown sensors) through two
streams of “uninte prete ” observations and commands. In this paper, we
argue that it is im ortant to characterize exactly what assumptions the agent
makes o these uninterpret d commands and observation, as the gener case
appears out of reach. We show that the assumptions can be encoded by group
nuisances that act on the semantic maps of the agent, and that the closed-loop
agent-world system must be invaria t to such nuisances.
time →
(a) Uninterpreted commands
(b) Uninterpreted observations (sensor #1)
(c) Uninterpreted observations (se sor #2)
Figure 2. Raw observations and commands streams for a robotic platform.
A bootstrapping agent must learn to use uninterpreted streams of observations
and commands. In these pictur s, we show how suc streams appear for an
actual robotic platform. The robot is a planar, differential-drive robot, and
the commands are taken to be the velocities. The two streams corresponds
to 64 randomly sampled sensels of a camera and a range-finder. The data
correspond to one minute of operation. Even with the advantage of knowing
the two types of sensors, can the reader guess which is which?
complexity of the human brain, of which—it is safe to say—
our colleagues in neurobiology will not have a clear, complete,
functional description for many decades to come. But this lack
of formalization prevents problems to be easily digested by the
more applied roboticists.
In this paper, we venture towards a precise formalization
of one aspect of bootstrapping problems: the idea that the
agent starts its interaction with the world by “uninterpreted”
observations and commands, whose semantics is unknown
(Fig. 1). Even if this only interests the first layer of a complete
bootstrapping architecture, it alone subsumes entire classes
of problems studied in robotics, including all problems of
2intrinsic and extrinsic calibration. Is it possible to make the
concept of “uninterpreted sensors and commands” mathemat-
ically precise? We give a formalization precise enough for the
problem to be described by concrete mathematical tools, which
in this case happens to be group theory. We give precise and
falsifiable conditions for an optimal agent that claims to use
uninterpreted observations and commands. Those conditions
also allow to discuss general principles for the design of the
first stages of an agent’s sensory processing.
More in detail, Section II discusses the general problem
of bootstrapping, and the impossibility of solving the general
case, thus motivating the search for a way to clearly express
the assumptions needed by an agent. Section III introduces the
idea of “semantic maps”, which map observations and com-
mands to the proper events in the agent’s internal model of the
world. The assumptions needed by the agent can be encoded
by the largest group of transformations of these semantic
maps that can be robustly tolerated. These transformations are
naturally represented by group actions that act as nuisances
applied the representation of commands and observations.
Therefore, one way to look at bootstrapping is as a problem
of nuisance rejection. However, these nuisances are not time-
variant “noise”: they are fixed (but unknown) transformations
that preserve the informative content of the signals. In Sec-
tion IV we discuss that the information-preserving nature of
the nuisances implies that the evolution of the closed-loop
world-agent system must be exactly invariant to the nuisances,
if there is any claim of optimality. In particular, the agent’s
behavior must be invariant to the observations nuisances, and
contra-variant to the commands nuisances. The last sections
discuss three general design principles to achieve invari-
ance with respect to observations nuisances: group averaging
(Section V), task invariance (Section VI) and observations
canonization using pontifical features (Section VII).
Throughout the paper, we keep the discussion quite general,
but we also give examples of group nuisances that are relevant
to the case of robotic sensors, and that we have encountered
in our previous research in bootstrapping models of robotic
sensorimotor cascades [5], [6], to which we refer the reader
interested in more complete examples of bootstrapping agents,
as in this paper we focus only on the agents assumptions about
observations and commands.
II. BOOTSTRAPPING NEEDS ASSUMPTIONS
We are interested in the interaction of a bootstrapping agent
with an unknown world. The interaction happens through a
stream of observations signals y(t) ∈ Y and commands u(t) ∈
U . The agent does not have previous knowledge neither of the
external world nor of its own sensors and actuators. In fact,
with “world” we refer to the unknown series of actuators,
external world, and sensors. Observations and commands
are “uninterpreted”, in the sense that there is no semantics
associated to them. The task for such an agent can be specified
either by an external reward signal, or it can be described
intrinsically [7]–[9] (for example, understanding the model of
the world is a task in itself that does not need an external
reward signal).
The many uncertainties involved in the problem make
classical techniques not applicable. Control theory techniques
for adaptive systems (e.g., [10]) assume relatively small classes
of models conveniently parametrized. In POMDPs [11], the
uncertainty is only in the observations and in the evolution of a
model that is otherwise known. Deep belief networks [12], [13]
are designed as universal approximators of data distributions,
but they do not deal with actions. Reinforcement learning [14]
gives a mathematical framework to deal with actions in
unknown state spaces, but it does not explain how to build
stateful representations from raw sensory values, which seems
to be the dominant problem.
In Fig. 2, we see an example of the uninterpreted data that
a bootstrapping agent should be able to use. Sensels (from
sensory elements) values are shown as intensity levels versus
time. These data comes from a robotic platform. Can you
even guess which one is the range-finder and which one is the
camera? And how would you use such a sensor? This is the
problem that you would need to solve if you were a brain-in-
a-jar that for the first time gets connected to an unknown body
in an unknown world. In fact, this is the problem that your
brain did solve: the cortex of the human brain is an extremely
flexible computational structure that can learn to process
different streams of information; for example, the cortex in
blind subjects rewires itself to process auditory signals [15],
[16] (lower levels of perception do exhibit adaptiveness, but
not so dramatic). Nature gives us a proof of existence that such
kind of problem is solvable, and that, assuming a reductionist
point of view, the computation required appears to be relatively
simple.
Still, we have to be careful when trying to formalize the
problem. At this level of generality, it also includes problems
which would be impossible to solve. In fact, the dynamical
system representing the world could realize a Turing machine,
and it is not difficult to think of a task which would be
equivalent to solving the halting problem. The other risk of
generalization is coming up with general theories that are too
abstract to give any insight for the design of actual agents.
For example, Hutter [17] considers the case of reward-based
agents, with no further assumptions about the world. He gives
a complete characterization of what would be the optimal
agent in such a setting; the results, otherwise very interesting,
are not applicable to real-world agents—for example, the
complexity of the generic optimal algorithm is just too high
for the rich stream of data of robotic sensors. Also, we are
interested in agents interacting with the real world; the general
diagram in Fig. 1 includes the case of a web spider exploring
the web, whose commands are URLs to retrieve, and whose
observations are the retrieved pages. It is unlikely that this
case will give any insight for real-world agents.
All this discussion points to the fact that it is either
impossible, or not really useful, to design agents that work
for any dynamical model for doing any task—in fact, the brain
evolved for a large but finite sets of tasks. Therefore, stating
precisely what are the assumptions on the world needed by a
bootstrapping agent appears as a fundamental step towards a
more formalized theory.
In this paper, we argue that it is possible to define rigorously
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particular with respect to the representation of observations
and commands, using the language of group theory. The aim
is to make a step towards a formalization of the early stages
of bootstrapping, where the agents needs to make sense of
“uninterpreted” data streams (we do not claim this point of
view is also useful for higher-level cognitive tasks).
III. SEMANTICS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND GROUP ACTIONS
This section describes a solid mathematical formalization
for the vague idea of having “uninterpreted” observations and
commands. Section III-A defines the concept of “semantic”
maps, in the sense that they map the raw observations and
commands to events in the internal model of the agent (what-
ever such model might be). In bootstrapping, such maps are
not completely known. Section III-B argues that the uncer-
tainty of the semantic maps can be adequately represented
by group actions acting on observations and commands. The
group actions that the agent can tolerate encode the assump-
tions that the agent has for the signals. Section III-C gives
several examples of groups nuisances relevant to robotics.
A. Semantics is given by maps between σ-algebras
The difference between a traditional design problem and
bootstrapping is that, in a traditional setting, one has a certain
semantics attached to the commands and observations. Let
us consider first the case of the observations. If we know
the semantics, it means that we can associate a particular
observation to an event relative to an internal model of the
world. For example, suppose that y = {yi}ni=1 are the readings
of a range-finder. Knowing the semantics of the data means
being able to state propositions such as “If y3 = 4, then
there are no obstacles for 4m in the direction θ3.”. Here
E1 =“y3 = 4” is an event relative to the observations, and
F =“there are no obstacles in the direction θ3” is an event
relative to an internal model of the world. The semantics of
the data allows to make many of such correspondences:
E1 : ”y3 = 4” ↔ F1 : "no obstacles at 30deg for 4m."
E2 : ”y3 = 5” ↔ F2 : "no obstacles at 30deg for 5m."
...
...
...
Formally, a collections of events, satisfying certain coherence
properties, is called σ-algebra [18]. Here we are dealing
with two σ-algebras: E = {E1, E2, . . . } is the σ-algebra of
the observations, and F = {F1, F2, . . . } corresponds to the
internal model. Thus, having fixed E and F , “knowing the
semantics of the data” can be defined precisely as knowing
the map η : E → F between the two σ-algebras.
We can give a similar construction for the commands. There
is a σ-algebra G = {G1, G2, . . . } whose events correspond to
particular choices of the commands (e.g., G1 =“u2 = 3”), and
these events can be mapped to the σ-algebra F of the model
(e.g., F1 =“angular velocity is 30deg/s”) by a map γ : G → F .
We are not specifying much about the internal model to
which the algebra F refers: for talking about the issues we are
interested in this paper, we just need to postulate the existence
of the maps η, γ, which we call semantic maps.
B. Groups nuisances encode agents assumptions
The observations/commands are completely “uninterpreted”
if the maps η, γ are completely unknown; but a bootstrapping
agent that can work with no information at all about the
semantics maps η, γ is only a theoretical possibility. In fact,
suppose that the n range-finder observations are represented by
a string of 16n bits, and, as part of the sensor protocol, these
bits are scrambled and encrypted before being transmitted to
the agent. Encryption is a 1-to-1 map that does not change the
informative content of the observations: it only changes the
map η that maps the particular bit string to the event in the
internal model. Therefore, if one claims that an agent can work
with no assumption whatsoever on η, γ, one is claiming that
such agent is flexible enough to undo any encryption scheme.
Thus it is critical to formalize the assumptions that boot-
strapping agents need; we show how this can be done with
group theory. The basic insight is that, instead of describing
what information the agent needs about η, γ, it is easier
to describe what information the agent does not need, or,
equivalently, what disturbances acting on η, γ the agent can
tolerate; and those disturbances are naturally represented by
group actions.
Continuing our example with the range-finder, suppose
that there are n readings {yi}ni=1. Usually, when designing
robot behavior, one assumes that the sensor calibration is
known. This means that the agent knows which direction θi
each readings yi belongs to; and therefore one knows the
correspondence between events about the i-th measurement
and the portion of the environment in direction θi. Suppose
that we want to require that the agent does not need the
assumption of having a calibrated sensor, in the sense that
it can recover this information through an intrinsic calibration
procedure [19]–[22]. This can be formalized by saying that
the agent is indifferent to a relabeling of the sensor elements.
A relabeling is represented by a permutation σ, such that the
vector of observations {yi}ni=1 are mapped to the new vector
{yσ(i)}ni=1, where σ(i) is the new label for the i-th sensel.
The set Perm(n) of permutation of sequences of length n is
the simplest example of group. A basic introduction to group
theory can be found in Rothman [23], but for convenience
we recall the few basic notions that we use. A group (G, ∗)
is a set G equipped with an associative operation ∗, such
that, for any two elements g1, g2 in G, also g1 ∗ g2 is in G.
Moreover, there is an identity element e, such that, for all g,
we have g ∗ e = e ∗ g = g; and there exists a g−1 such
that g−1 ∗ g = e. However, in general, the operation is not
commutative: g1∗g2 6= g2∗g1. One can verify that Perm(n) is
a group, because two permutations can be composed to obtain
a new permutation, and each permutation can be inverted.
Groups are the simplest mathematical object that can be used
to describe invertible transformations applied to the data that
are not commutative. Technically, these transformations are
called group actions. We say that a group G acts on a set Y ,
if there exists an operation “·”, such that for any g in G, and
any y in Y , g·y (read “g applied to y”) is still an element of Y ,
e ·y = y, and the coherence condition (g1∗g2) ·y = g1 ·(g2 ·y)
is verified.
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the agent, by describing the transformations of the semantic
maps η, γ to which the agent must be robust. If we wanted to
give the most generic treatment, given that the “world” is a
dynamical object, we would consider generic (causal) transfor-
mations of such dynamical system that preserve information
(i.e., the σ-algebra of the events). However, we do not lose
much of the important ideas if we limit the discussion to
instantaneous transformations of observations and commands.
Let GU be a group acting on the commands u(t) ∈ U , and GY
be a group acting on the observations y(t) ∈ Y . By acting on
the spaces U , Y , the groups also act on the semantic maps η, γ.
For example, if originally we had
η({y3 = 4}) = ”there are no obstacles in direction θ3", (1)
then if σ ∈ GY = Perm(n), we have the new semantic map
η′ = σ · η, such that
η′({y3 = 4}) = ”there are no obstacles in direction θσ(3)".
(2)
Equivalently, the group GU acts on the map γ.
At this point, we have a way to characterize precisely what
are the assumptions for an agent: an agent’s assumptions are
described by two groups GU , GY acting on the commands U ,
and observations Y , such that the agent’s task is still attainable
if its semantic maps are replaced by (gY · η, gU · γ), for
arbitrary gY ∈ GY , and gU ∈ GU . The larger the groups, the
more flexible the agent is. For an agent that cannot tolerate
any disturbance, we let (GY ,GU ) = (Id, Id), where Id is the
identity group {e}.
In Section IV we shall give an argument that not only
the task should be achievable, but also invariant to these
perturbations; but before that, in the next section, we give some
examples of group nuisances that are relevant for robotics.
C. Some nuisance groups relevant for robotics
Table I shows some representative examples of group nui-
sances relevant for robotics.
Sensel values permutations: We already discussed permuta-
tions: they exchange the values of two sensels. A permutation
nuisance represents the fact that the agent makes no assump-
tions on the ordering of the sensels in the observation vector.
Linear transformations: Linear transformations are the sim-
plest case of nuisances that somehow mix the different signals.
Let GL(n) be the set of all invertible n×n matrices. This is a
group under the operation of matrix multiplication. The action
of GL(n) maps each observation into a linear combination
of all other observations. A linear transformation nuisance
can encode the fact that agent needs no assumptions on the
coordinate frame used to represent the observation, as well as
invariance to rotation, scaling, etc.
Uniform and non-uniform sensel warping: Let Diff(R)
be the set of diffeomorphisms (smooth invertible functions)
from R to itself. These form a group, because the composi-
tion of two diffeomorphisms is an associative operation that
produces another diffeomorphism, and an inverse always exist.
Suppose that y ∈ Rn. A map f ∈ Diff(R) acts on the obser-
vations by mapping yi 7→ f(yi); or, more generally, we can
think that there is a different nuisance for each observations:
yi 7→ fi(yi). A diffeomorphism nuisance encodes the fact that
agent does not make any assumption on the representation
(scale, measurement units, etc.) of a single command. But note
that diffeomorphisms preserve (or reverse) the order relations
of values (a < b ⇔ f(a) < f(b)), so that an agent indifferent
to sensel values diffeomorphisms might still have assumptions
on concepts such as “less intense” and “more intense”.
Sensel space diffeomorphism: Assume that the observations
are a field {ys}, where s ∈ S is a spatial index that spans
the sensel space S, which is assumed to be a differentiable
manifold. For example, suppose the sensor is a camera, and S
is the visual sphere. A diffeomorphism nuisance ϕ ∈ Diff(S)
maps ys 7→ yϕ(s). The meaning of a diffeomorphism nuisance
is that the agent does not know the position of its sensels on
the visual sphere; using the computer vision jargon, the sensor
is not intrinsically calibrated.
General automorphisms: The largest group of nuisances
that we might consider is the group of automorphisms Aut(Y):
it includes all possible 1-to-1 maps from the set Y to itself.
This includes arbitrary encryption of the bit representation of
the data, and it corresponds to the agent having no assumption
whatsoever for the representation of the observations.
IV. INVARIANCE AND CONTRA-VARIANCE
In this section, we claim that not only the agent’s behavior
should be robust to the group nuisances, but the overall
evolution of the system must be invariant as well, if the
agent has any claim of optimality. Here we need a separate
discussion for the observations and the commands. For the
observations (Section IV-B) the agent’s behavior must be
invariant to the nuisance; for the commands (Section IV-C),
the agent must be contra-variant, because those nuisances
must be compensated.
Table I
GROUPS NUISANCES ACTING ON THE OBSERVATIONS
nuisance group GY Y action
Sensels values
permutation
σ ∈ Perm(n) Xn yi 7→ yσ(i)
Linear
transformation
A ∈ GL(n) Rn yi 7→
∑
j A
j
iyj
Sensel space
diffeomorphism
f ∈ Diff(S) C(S;R) ys 7→ yϕ(s), s ∈ S
Uniform
sensel warping
f ∈ Diff(R) Rn yi 7→ f(yi)
Non-uniform
sensel warping
{fi} ∈ (Diff(R))n Rn yi 7→ fi(yi)
Generic
mapping
ϕ ∈ Aut(Y) any y(t) 7→ f(y(t))
The third column shows what are the assumptions on the observations space Y
for the nuisance to make sense. For permutations, Y = Xn indicates that each
sensel value yi must belong to the same space Xn; for the diffeomorphisms,
Y = C(S;R) indicates that the observations are a continuous function over
some manifold S; automorphisms make sense for any Y; and for the others
we assume Y = Rn.
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At this point, we have clearly defined what is the meaning
of the nuisances that appear in Fig. 1: instead of the observa-
tions y(t), the agent receives g ·y(t), with g a fixed, unknown
element of GY ; and, likewise, the commands u(t) chosen by
the agent are corrupted by the action of the group GU . The
larger the groups GU , GY , the closer we are to the situation
of completely uninterpreted data.
The diagram of Fig. 1 might look familiar; note, however,
that usually nuisances are taken to be “noise”, that is, time-
variable quantities that perturb the signals and lose infor-
mation, thereby irremediably degrading the performance of
the agent. In this case, instead, the nuisances are fixed but
unknown, and they preserve information: because they are
groups actions, it is always possible to find the group element
that reverses their effect. The nuisances do not change, in
principle, what is possible for the agent to do: therefore, an
optimal agent must necessarily act as to make the closed-loop
system invariant to the nuisances.
B. Invariance to observations nuisances
It turns out that there is an asymmetry for the cases of
observations and commands nuisances. For the observations,
it is clear that the actions of the agent must be invariant to the
observations nuisances. Let u(t) = Θ({y(t),y(t − 1), . . . })
be the actions of the agents as a function Θ of the history
of the observations {y(t),y(t− 1), . . . }. Then, the condition
that must be satisfied by an optimal agent that the actions are
invariant to any g ∈ GY is that
Θ({g ·y(t), g ·y(t−1), . . . }) = Θ({y(t),y(t−1), . . . }). (3)
A simple example of this optimality principle is in the pattern
recognition problem, where decision rules should be invariant
to position, orientation, and scale of the pattern, and this nec-
essary invariance guides the design of detectors (e.g., [24]);
in that case, the nuisance group consists of Euclidean trans-
formation of the plane plus scaling.
The case of observations nuisances seems to be the simplest
of the two, because this invariance can be achieved using
some preprocessing of the observations which is relatively
independent of the rest of the agent. In the next sections we
shall see three design principles to achieve this invariance.
C. Contra-variance to commands nuisances
Group nuisances acting on the commands seem to be harder
to handle. Here, we assume that the commands u(t) chosen
by the agent are corrupted by a group GU , so that the world
receives the commands u′(t) = g·u(t), where g is an unknown
element of GU . The agent never sees the corrupted signal u′(t)
directly; it is only aware of the nuisance by its effect on the
world, whose model is unknown. In this case the agent, rather
than being invariant to the commands nuisances, must be able
to compensate for them. If the optimal commands were u(t)
in the case without nuisances, then the optimal commands in
the case of a nuisance g must be g−1 ·u(t), where g−1 is the
inverse of g with respect to the group operation. In that case,
the nuisance would be compensated, because g ·(g−1 ·u(t)) =
(g ∗ g−1) · u(t) = u(t). Technically, this is called contra-
variance. Unfortunately, no principled, generic way is known
to achieve this contra-variance.
V. INVARIANCE BY GROUP AVERAGING
Having established that invariance of to the observations
nuisances is a worthy goal, we now turn to the question of how
to achieve it. In particular, the interesting question is whether
there are some design principles that give some guidance in
designing the agent.
One general method found in the literature is group av-
eraging. Assume the nuisance group G is applied to the
data y0 ∈ Y , so that y = g · y0 is observed instead of y0,
with g being an arbitrary element of G. Assume that one
must compute an action from y, and this computation must
be invariant to G; however, one only has a rule f which is
not invariant to G, in the sense that f(y0) 6= f(g · y0). Then,
one can simply average over the group, to obtain a smoothed
version of f that is invariant by construction. Assuming G
compact [25], the averaged f can be written by integrating
over the Haar measure for the group:
fG(y) =
ˆ
G
f(g · y)dG, (4)
However, there is no guarantee that the result of group
averaging achieves a better performance than f in the task; in
the worst case, the smoothed function fG gets smoothed too
much and becomes 0, which is invariant but rather useless.
VI. INVARIANCE BY INVARIANT TASK DESIGN
Another way to achieve invariance to the observations
nuisances is to make sure that the task is specified in a way
which is invariant to the nuisances. Suppose that the task is
represented by a known objective function J(y,u), that the
agent must minimize with respect to u (this only works with
an “intrinsic” function of known structure, not with an external
reward). The idea is that if the objective function is invariant
to the group nuisances acting on the observations, then it does
not matter how the minimization takes place. Technically, the
property that must be verified is that
J(g · y,u) = J(y,u), for all g ∈ GY . (5)
An example in the literature is in “natural” actor-critic algo-
rithms [26] where the objective is shown to be invariant to a
reparametrization, which acts as the nuisance in that problem.
A. Example of a servoing task
In previous work [5], we studied bootstrapping problems
where the intrinsic task is servoing: given a goal observa-
tions y?, choose the commands u such that y(t)→ y?. This
is an example of an intrinsic task that makes sense for multiple
sensor modalities; in fact, we used it to show that the same
bootstrapping agent can deal with multiple robotic sensors
(camera, range-finder, and field sampler). One way to solve
the problem is to pose it as minimizing the objective function
J(y(t),u(t)) = ‖y(t+ 1)− y?‖22, (6)
6where the dependence on u is implicit in the fact that we are
considering the next observation y(t+ 1). However, whether
this is an admissible choice depends on the groups nuisances
acting on the observations.
1) Linear transformation: Consider the case of y =
{yi}ni=1 ∈ Rn, and the nuisance group GL(n). The objective
function (6) is not invariant to a linear scaling yi 7→
∑
j A
j
iyj ,
for A ∈ GL(n). In this case, what happens is that the
nuisance action changes the relative importance of each sensel.
Therefore, an agent minimizing (6) cannot be optimal in any
sense, because its behavior depends on the nuisance. One way
to fix the situation is to consider a slightly modified error
function:
J(y(t),u(t)) = (y(t+1)−y?)T (cov{y})−1 (y(t+1)−y?).
(7)
One can verify that this objective function is invariant to the
action of GL(n) as a linear scaling of y is compensated by
the opposite scaling of (cov{y})−1.
2) Diffeomorphisms: We consider the analogous problem
when the nuisance is a diffeomorphism. Here we assume that
y = {ys}s∈S , with s being a continuous index that spans over
some differentiable manifold S, so that we can write the error
as an integral over S:
J(y(t),u(t)) = 12 ∫
s∈S
(ys(t+ 1)− y?s )2 dS. (8)
The diffeomorphism nuisance ϕ ∈ Diff(S) maps ys 7→ yϕ(s).
If y is an image, a diffeomorphism dilates and shrinks parts
of it. Therefore, the objective function 8 is not invariant to
diffeomorphisms. With a bit of algebra, one can show [6]
that the slightly modified version
J(y(t),u(t)) = 12 ∫
s∈S
(ys(t+1)−y?s )2
√
det(cov{∇sys}) dS
(9)
is invariant to diffeomorphism; the trick is that the term
det(cov{∇sys}) compensates for shrinking or dilation. Note
that for both (7) and (9) the principle is to find a statistics of
the data that can be incorporated in the objective function to
compensate the nuisance.
VII. INVARIANCE BY PONTIFICAL CANONIZATION
Soatto [27] introduced a principled way to achieve invari-
ance to group nuisances which can be generalized to our case.
The basic idea is to make use of “pontifical” features that allow
to define “canonical” representation of the data, which are
invariant to the nuisances (Section VII-A). We generalize the
idea to use “weak” pontifical features that identify a canonical
element up to a transformation (Section VII-B). Then we apply
the theory to the case of bootstrapping (Section VII-C) and
study canonization procedures for the nuisances previously
introduced (Table II).
A. Pontifical features identify canonical representations
It is convenient to first discuss the theory with relation to
static observations. Suppose that some process produces data
y ∈ Y , which is then corrupted by a group nuisance G, so that
we observe y˜ = g · y, with g being an arbitrary and unknown
element of G. Thus, for each original y, we can observe any
element of the set G · y , {g · y | g ∈ G}, which is called the
orbit of y. Pontifical features allow to choose, for each orbit
G·y, a canonical representation, thus achieving invariance with
respect to the group nuisance.
Definition 1. A map φ : Y 7→ R≥1, is a strong pontifical
feature for the group G acting on Y if, fixed y, the equation
φ(g · y) = 0, g ∈ G, (10)
has exactly one solution in G, which is denoted by gφy ∈ G.
Equation (10) can be interpreted as follows: φ(y) = 0 is
a certain property that the data need satisfy; the fact that
φ(g·y) = 0 is always solvable for g means that one can always
find an element of the nuisance group that transforms the data
as to satisfy that property. We call such a feature “pontifical”
because, given its knowledge, one can find a “canonical”
representation for y. In fact, suppose that we observe the
data y1 = g1 · y, where g1 ∈ G is the unknown nuisance
acting on the pristine data y. If we know a strong pontifical
feature φ, we can solve (10) to find gφy1 and then compute the
representation yˆ = gφy1 · y1.
Definition 2. The canonical representation of y corresponding
to the strong pontifical feature φ is the element yˆ = gφy · y,
which by construction satisfies φ(yˆ) = 0.
The canonical representation yˆ does not depend on the
particular group nuisance g1 that corrupted the data in the
first place, and it is unique for each orbit2.
Example 3. Suppose we have a signal y ∈ Rn, with yi > 0,
representing intensity values (thus the positivity constraint)
that are corrupted by an unknown gain k > 0, which maps
y 7→ ky. One can obtain a canonical representation using
the mapping y 7→ y/‖y‖2. Here, the unknown gain can be
represented by the group nuisance G = (R+0 ,×), and the
strong pontifical feature used is φ(y) = ‖y‖2 − 1.
B. Weak pontifical features identify heresy subgroups
A strong pontifical feature can be a rare luxury. In practice,
we often have available features which do not quite identify a
unique canonical representation.
Definition 4. A map φ : Y 7→ R≥1 is a weak pontifical
feature for the group G acting on Y if, once a data y is fixed,
the constraint equation (10) has a non-empty set of solutions
{h·gφy |h ∈ Hφy } ⊂ G, where gφy ∈ G and Hφy is a subgroup G.
According to this definition, a strong pontifical feature is a
particular case of a weak pontifical feature where Hφy is the
identity group. If we only have a weak pontifical feature, we
can choose multiple elements {gi} ⊂ Gφy to compute a set of
2 In fact, suppose that, instead of y1 = g1 ·y, we had observed y2 = g2 ·y
(same original data y, different group nuisance g2). Let yˆi = g
φ
yi · yi be
the result of canonization. By construction, we know that φ(yˆi) = φ(g
φ
yi ·
gi · y) = 0. By virtue of associativity of group action, this can be written as
φ((gφyigi) · y) = 0. Because φ is pontifical, given a fixed y, there is only
one solution to the group element acting on it. Thus gφy1g1 = g
φ
y2g2 and
consequently yˆ1 = (g
φ
y1g1) · y = (gφy2g2) · y = yˆ2.
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PONTIFICAL-FEATURE BASED CANONIZATION OF NUISANCES
nuisance group G,
action on W
pontifical feature
constraint φ(W) = 0
canonization map heresy subgroup
HW ≤ G
Sensel values bias v ∈ Rn
yi(t) 7→ yi(t) + vi
E{yi} = 0 vφW = −E{yi} Id
Linear
transformation
A ∈ GL(n)
yi(t) 7→ Aijyi(t)
cov(y) = I AφW = cov(y)
− 1
2 O(n)
Sensel space
diffeomorphism
ϕ ∈ Diff(S)
y(s, t) 7→ y(ϕ(s), t)
cov(∇y) = αI For S = S1:
ϕφW(θ) = c± α ∫θ0 (var{∇y(β)})−
1
2 dβ
Isom(S)
Non-uniform
sensel warping
f ∈ Diff(R)
yi(t) 7→ fi(yi(t))
yi ∼ Uniform(0, 1) fφW : yi(t) 7→ percentile(yi(t), yT) (±1,×)
transformed data {yˆi} = {gi·y}, all of them satisfying φ(yˆi) =
0. There cannot be multiple “canonical” elements, thus all of
them (possibly except one, which we do not know anyway)
must be “heretic”, hence we call Hφy the heresy subgroup of φ
with respect to G.
A weak pontifical feature still helps in achieving invariance,
by allowing a partial canonization that reduces the nuisance
group G to the smallest subgroup Hφy . This suggests a modular
architecture where pontifical features are used in succession
to reduce the original nuisance group to incrementally smaller
uncertainties, until complete invariance is achieved.
Example 5. To generalize the previous example, consider the
case of a multiplicative scalar gain k ∈ R acting on a signal
y ∈ Rn (we dropped the positivity constraint, allowing yi Q
0). A reasonable normalization step consists in computing
y 7→ y/‖y‖2, or y 7→ −y/‖y‖2. The two possible choices arise
because the feature φ(y) = ‖y‖2−1 is only a weak pontifical
feature for the group G = (R,×), and its corresponding
heresy subgroup is Hφy = ({−1,+1},×). To achieve complete
invariance, we can use a successive canonization stage, by
using, for example, the feature φ′(y) = sign(y1)− 1.
C. Examples of invariance via canonization
To apply this theory to the case of bootstrapping, we have
to be careful that, even though we have been considering
instantaneous nuisances, we aim at obtaining a canonization
of the whole dynamical system W representing the world that
produces those observations. Instead of canonizing the single
observation, what we need to do is finding a canonization Wˆ
of W. Consequently, a pontifical feature φ(W) is, in general,
a function of statistics of the complete time series of observa-
tions and commands.
1) Canonization of sensel values bias: The simplest case
is compensating for a bias in the measurements. Here, the
group GY is simply the vector space Rn equipped with
addition as the group operation. The pontifical feature that
we can use is
φ(W) = E{y} = 0. (11)
Note the feature is a function of the entire dynamical sys-
tem W, and is written using a statistical operation, in this case,
the expectation of the observations. By solving the equation
φ(g ·W) = 0, we obtain that the canonical transformation is
gφW = −E{y}, and the canonical representation Wˆ is W in
series with an instantaneous filter which removes the mean.
We note that, in this case, φ is a strong pontifical feature,
therefore its heresy group is the identity group.
2) Canonization of sensel value linear transformation:
Another simple example is the case of GY = GL(n) acting on
the observations y(t) ∈ Rn. The nuisances maps y 7→ Ay,
where A ∈ GL(n) is any invertible matrix. Consider the
candidate feature
φ(W) = cov{y} − I. (12)
where cov indicates the variance-covariance matrix of the
observations. One solution of the canonization transformation
is given by gφW = (cov{y})−
1
2 , where the square root is
taken in the sense of the operator square root [28]. One
can verify that such transformation, called whitening in the
signal processing literature [29], guarantees that the covariance
matrix of the data be the the identity matrix.
In this case, the feature φ is only a weak pontifical feature,
because we can find other solutions. For example, gφW =
−cov{y}− 12 is a different canonization transformation which
still satisfies the feature constraint. In general, one finds that a
successive mapping y 7→My preserves the covariance matrix
if and only if M ∈ O(n), and therefore O(n) is the heresy
group for the feature.
3) Canonization of sensel space diffeomorphism: As a
slightly more advanced example, we consider the case of a
diffeomorphism nuisance, as introduced in Section III-C. We
can show that a weak pontifical feature is
φ(W) = cov{∇sy(s)} − αI, s ∈ S, (13)
where α > 0 is a parameter to be determined. Suppose that
we are talking about an image. We are imposing that the
covariance of the image gradients is constant at each point
of the sensel space S. A diffeomorphism nuisance dilates
or expands certain parts of the image; this pontifical feature
ensures that the statistics are uniform on the visual sphere.
Let ϕ ∈ Diff(S) be a group element acting on the image.
The constraint equation φ(ϕ ·W) = 0 can be written as
Jcov{∇sy(s)}J∗ = I, s ∈ S, (14)
8where J = ∂ϕ/∂s is the Jacobian of the transformation;
note that, even if ϕ is in general nonlinear, the gradients are
transformed linearly by the Jacobian. Equation (14) needs to
be integrated to obtain the canonization transformation3. Also
in this case the feature is only a weak feature, and we can
identify the group of isometries of S as the heresy group
for the feature. In fact, another diffeomorphism preserves the
feature if and only if the Jacobian is orthogonal everywhere,
and this implies that the diffeomorphism is an isometry [30].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It is critical to establish what are the assumptions that
a bootstrapping agent needs on the world, as it appears
extremely hard (and perhaps not useful) to solve the problem
in full generality. In classical control problems, one has
assumptions about the family of models under consideration
(e.g., linear systems); in bootstrapping problems there are in
addition assumptions about the semantics of the data. We
showed that those assumptions can be described by the group
nuisances acting on the agent’s semantic maps that the agent
can tolerate. Moreover, for an agent that claims any kind of
optimality, it is necessary that the world-agent loop evolution
be exactly invariant to such nuisances. The agent itself must
be invariant to the nuisances acting on the observations, and
contra-variant to those acting on the commands. For the
nuisances acting the observations, we described three design
principles to achieve the required invariance (group averaging,
task invariance, and pontifical features), and we gave several
examples for the nuisances common in a robotic system.
This shows that it is possible to formalize problems that
at first sight are quite vague (the observations and com-
mands are “uninterpreted”) so that they can be approached
with the relevant mathematical tools. Future work involves
understanding whether generic design principles can be es-
tablished for the nuisances on the commands, and whether
this formalisms of semantic group nuisances is useful for
understanding properties of bootstrapping agents at a higher
level than the instantaneous continuous/analog sensorimotor
interaction considered here.
Acknowledgments. Thanks to Scott Livingston for the
many insightful comments on a very short notice.
3We can give a closed form solution for the case S = S1 (the unit
circle). We need to find a diffeomorphism ϕ ∈ Diff(S1). In 1D, we can
parametrize the circle by the angle θ, the jacobian J is simply ∂ϕ/∂θ, and
equation (14) can be written as
(
∂ϕ
∂θ
)2
var{∇θy(θ)} = α. Because ϕ is
a diffeomorphism, we know ∂ϕ/∂θ 6= 0; therefore, it has the same sign
everywhere. We can choose the positive sign and obtain ∂ϕ/∂θ = α c(θ)
with c(θ) = 1/
√
var{∇θy(θ)} is a known statistic of the data. Moreover,
we have the constraint that
´ 2pi
0 ∂ϕ/∂θ = 2pi, because the circle must be
mapped onto itself, which allows to choose the constant α. One final solution
is given by
ϕ(θ) = α
ˆ θ
0
1√
var{∇y(β)} dβ, α = 2pi/
ˆ 2pi
0
1√
var{∇y(θ)} dθ.
(15)
To this solution, we have to add the isometries, consisting in the reflection
ϕ′(θ) = ϕ(−θ) (mod 2pi) and the rotations ϕ′(θ) = ϕ(θ) + c (mod 2pi).
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